

## How America Helped to Bolshevise Russia



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One of the primary elements in the analysis of 20<sup>th</sup> century history has been the assumption of an almost Zoroastrian ‘tremendous dichotomy’<sup>1</sup> of ‘good versus evil’ manifested in the conflict between the “Free World” and communism. Hence, the eminent Russian expert for the US State Department, George F Kennan, writes in his seminal book on the Allied intervention in Russia during the Civil War that,

‘there are those today who see the winter of 1917-1918 as one of the great turning points of modern history, the point at which there separated and branched out, clearly and for all to see, the two great conflicting answers – totalitarian and liberal – to the emerging problems of the modern age...’<sup>2</sup>

However this epochal event, ‘clearly and for all to see’, is largely a myth. The assumption that the ‘Cold War’ was the continuation of a conflict between capitalism and communism that had been going on since the October 1917 Revolution does not take into account the new situation that was presented when Stalin declined to continue his wartime alliance with the USA and support American plans for a new world order which hinged on (1) The United Nations Organisation General Assembly functioning as a ‘world parliament’<sup>3</sup> and (2) the ‘Baruch Plan’ for the

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<sup>1</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, recalled: ‘The US position in fact allowed the UN to be turned into an instrument for imposing the will of one group of states upon another, above all the Soviet Union as the sole socialist member of the [Security] Council’. Andrei Gromyko, *Memories* (London: Hutchinson, 1989).

‘internationalisation of atomic energy.’<sup>4</sup> The USSR was to perceive both these twin pillars of post-war US global policy as a guise for American global hegemony.<sup>5</sup>

Hence, the perception that the ‘Cold War’ was a continuation of Allied policy since the 1917-1920 intervention in Russia is incorrect, and rests on the assumption that the intervention was motivated by anti-Bolshevism, which it was not.

Not only was Cold War American foreign policy *not* ‘anti-communist’, but it proactively supported *certain types* of Leftism that could be utilised in its fight against what might more accurately be regarded as *Russian national-collectivism*,<sup>6</sup> starting from the assumption to power of Stalin and ending with the assumption to power of Gorbachev.<sup>7</sup>

The purpose of Allied intervention in the Civil War was not to defeat Bolshevism, but to maintain Allied interests at a time when the Great War was still being fought and when the Bolsheviks seemed to be inclined towards a separate peace with Germany. Nor did this Allied intervention, once Russia had been taken out of the war, and America had entered, transform at any stage into a determined effort by capitalism to destroy the very precarious Bolshevik regime.

Yet the myth of Allied anti-Bolshevism remains a subject of much study. For example David S Fogles, having alluded to American President Woodrow Wilson’s penchant for secrecy and the lie, states of American intervention:

From the Bolshevik Revolution to the end of the Civil War the United States sought to encourage and support anti-Bolshevik movements in a variety of secretive and semi-secret ways. Constrained by a declared commitment to the principal of self-determination and hemmed by idealistic and later isolationist sentiments, Wilson and his advisors pursued methods of assisting anti-Bolshevik forces that evaded public scrutiny and avoided the need for congressional appropriations.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Gromyko stated of the ‘Baruch Plan’: ‘The actual intention was to be camouflaged by the creation of an international body to monitor the use of nuclear energy. However, Washington did not even try to hide that it intended to take the leading part in this body, to keep in its own hands everything to do with the production and storage of fissionable material and, under the guise of the need for international inspection, to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign nations’. Andrei Gromyko, *Memories*, *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> K R Bolton, ‘Origins of the Cold War: How Stalin Foiled a New World Order’, *Foreign Policy Journal*, May 31, 2010. < <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/31/origins-of-the-cold-war-how-stalin-foild-a-new-world-order/all/1>>

<sup>6</sup> The epochal fight between Stalin and Trotsky over the question of who would rule Soviet Russia was ideologically that of ‘socialism in one country’ versus ‘world revolution’, respectively.

<sup>7</sup> The manner by which the USA sought to recruit anti-Stalinist Leftists, including of course Trotskyites, is exemplified by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, sponsored by the CIA, which launched the careers of such anti-Soviet, pro-Marxist luminaries as the feminist guru Gloria Steinem. See: Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: the CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York, The New Press, 2000).

The subversive role of the Congress for Cultural Freedom has now been taken over by the National Endowment for Democracy, another institution with US official backing, that also has a noticeable Trotskyite foundation. See for example on the founder of the NED, Tom Kahn: Rachelle Horowitz, ‘Tom Kahn and the Fight for Democracy: A Political Portrait and Personal Recollection’, *Dissent Magazine*, pp. 238-239.

<[http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article\\_pdfs/d11Horowitz.pdf](http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d11Horowitz.pdf)>

<sup>8</sup> David S Fogles, *America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: US Intervention in the Russian Civil War*, (University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 5.

While maintaining diplomatic relations with the representative in the USA of the deposed Provisional Government, Fogles states that Wilson's policy was one of covertly providing funds and other support to anti-Bolshevik forces, particularly in Siberia, where Wilson sanctioned American troops in 1918. Fogles describes this as an 'undeclared war against Bolshevism' which continued even after the defeat of the remaining White armies in Russia in 1920.<sup>9</sup> However, Fogles also alludes to the manner by which the US intervention embittered anti-Bolsheviks who considered it to be inadequate meddling and 'irresolute'.<sup>10</sup>

Fogles quotes Ludwig Martens, who was representing Bolshevik interests in the USA, as publicly condemning the US intervention against the Soviets as tantamount to 'waging war against the Russian people'.<sup>11</sup> Yet that does not explain the situation. Martens had set up the Soviet Bureau at the World Tower Building in New York in 1919, and had successfully engaged in extensive deals with American firms. When the Soviet Bureau offices were raided by agents of the Lusk Committee of New York on June 12, 1919, communications with approximately a thousand firms were found.<sup>12</sup> A British intelligence report noted that the J P Morgan company, Guaranty Trust Company of New York, was funding Martens.<sup>13</sup>

Fogles states that despite the US involvement in the Allied intervention, the Soviet regime considered the USA to be the most likely source from which to secure diplomatic and commercial relations.<sup>14</sup> Given the duplicitous nature of President Wilson, mentioned by Fogles as being at the back of a covert anti-Bolshevik policy, placed in the context of other aspects of the US involvement in Russia, the assumption that Wilson was intent on a secret anti-Bolshevik policy might not be so convincing.

Professor Sutton, a specialist in the technological development of the USSR,<sup>15</sup> maintained that the 'hidden policy' of the USA was not one of anti-Bolshevism, but was aimed at securing the Bolshevik regime and establishing commercial and financial interests.

### **Henry Wickham Steed Stymied Aims of Bolsheviks and Bankers**

Something of the hidden and unofficial diplomacy around the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to secure recognition of the Bolshevik regime was recounted in the memoirs of H Wickham Steed, editor of *The London Times* who undertook an influential campaign against recognition of the Bolsheviks.

In a first-hand account of the conference Steed stated that proceedings were interrupted by the return from Moscow of William C. Bullitt and Lincoln Steffens, 'who had been sent to Russia towards the middle of February by Colonel House'<sup>16</sup> and

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<sup>9</sup> David S Fogles, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism*, *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> David S Fogles, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism*, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> David S Fogles, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism*, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Antony C Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York: Arlington House, 1974), p. 115.

<sup>13</sup> Basil H Thompson, Special Report No. 5 (Secret), British Home Office Directorate of Intelligence, Scotland Yard, London July 14, 1919; US State Dept. Decimal File, 316-22-656. Cited, by Antony C Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, *ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>14</sup> David S Fogles, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Antony C Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, three volumes: 1917-1930, 1930-1945, 1945-1965. Also, Antony C Sutton, *National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union* (Melbourne: League of Rights, 1973).

<sup>16</sup> US President Woodrow Wilson's ever-present confidante and adviser.

Mr. Lansing<sup>17</sup>, for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein for the benefit of the American Commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace'.<sup>18</sup> Steed also refers to British Prime Minister Lloyd George as being likely to have known of the Mission and its purpose. Steed stated that international finance was behind the move for recognition of the Bolshevik regime and other moves in favour of the Bolsheviks:

Potent international financial interests were at work in favour of the immediate recognition of the Bolsheviks. Those influences had been largely responsible for the Anglo-American proposal in January to call Bolshevik representatives to Paris at the beginning of the Peace Conference — a proposal which had failed after having been transformed into a suggestion for a Conference with the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo...<sup>19</sup>

In return for diplomatic recognition the Bolsheviks were offering 'extensive commercial and economic concessions'.

Steed related that he was contacted by Wilson's adviser, 'Colonel' House, who was concerned at Steed's exposé of the relationship between Bolsheviks and international financiers:

That day Colonel House asked me to call upon him. I found him worried both by my criticism of any recognition of the Bolsheviks and by the certainty, which he had not previously realized, that if the President were to recognize the Bolsheviks in return for commercial concessions his whole 'idealism' would be hopelessly compromised as commercialism in disguise. I pointed out to him that not only would Wilson be utterly discredited but that the League of Nations would go by the board, because all the small peoples and many of the big peoples of Europe would be unable to resist the Bolshevism which Wilson would have accredited.<sup>20</sup>

House in Machiavellian manner asked Steed to compromise, to support humanitarian aid supposedly for the benefit of all Russians. Steed agreed to consider this, but soon after talking with House found out that British Prime Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson were to proceed with recognition the following day. Steed therefore wrote the leading article for the Paris *Daily Mail* of March 28 exposing the manoeuvres and asking how a pro-Bolshevik attitude was consistent with Wilson's declared moral principles for the post-war world?

...Who are the tempters that would dare whisper into the ears of the Allied and Associated Governments? They are not far removed from the men who preached peace with profitable dishonour to the British people in July, 1914. They are akin to, if not identical with, the men who sent Trotsky and some

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<sup>17</sup> US Secretary of State.

<sup>18</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years 1892-1922 A personal narrative*, (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1924), 'The Peace Conference', *The Bullitt Mission*, Vol. 2, p.301.

<sup>19</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, *ibid.*

scores of associate desperadoes to ruin the Russian Revolution as a democratic, anti-German force in the spring of 1917.<sup>21</sup>

Charles Crane<sup>22</sup>, who had recently talked with Wilson, told Steed that Wilson was about to recognise the Bolsheviks, which would result in negative public opinion in the USA and destroy Wilson's post-War internationalist aims. Significantly Crane also identified the pro-Bolshevik faction as being that of Big Business, stating to Steed: 'Our people at home will certainly not stand for the recognition of the Bolsheviks at the bidding of Wall Street'. Steed was again seen by House, who stated that Steed's article in the Paris *Daily Mail*, 'had got under the President's hide'. House asked that Steed postpone further exposés in the press, and again raised the prospect of recognition based on humanitarian aid. Lloyd George was also greatly perturbed by Steed's articles in the *Daily Mail* and complained that he could not undertake a 'sensible' policy towards the Bolsheviks while the press had an anti-Bolshevik attitude.<sup>23</sup>

What can be seen in the manoeuvres of this early period was that both American and British governments desired to recognise the Soviet regime while the world was being told that the Allies were assisting anti-Bolshevik forces in toppling the Soviet regime. Diplomatic recognition of the Soviets by the USA and Britain had only been forestalled due to the vigorous campaign of individuals such as Wickham Steed in making the machinations of the Allies and the Bolsheviks public. Nonetheless such non-recognition did not prevent a lively commercial relationship developing between Western business and the Soviet regime.

### **Reasons for Allied Intervention**

The reasons for Allied intervention had nothing to do with 'stopping Bolshevism'. The original concerns involved Russia in the war against Germany. Kennan states that when the Americans sent their first representative to Archangel in 1917, 'At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd the allies were interested in Archangel not only for its importance as a channel of entrance and egress for European Russia but that also for the fact that here too, as at Vladivostok, war supplies shipped to former Russian governments had accumulated in large quantities'.<sup>24</sup> This material included 2,000 tons of aluminium, 2,100 tons of antimony, 14,000 tons of copper, 5,230 tons of lead, etc.<sup>25</sup> With the possibility of Russia concluding an armistice with Germany the Allies were anxious to recover the stocks. The Bolsheviks dispatched a commission to the region to secure Archangel and deliver the war materials to the interior.<sup>26</sup> Despite the arrival of two British ships, the British sat by for several months while the Bolsheviks removed the war materials.<sup>27</sup>

The second factor was to ensure the safety of Czech soldiers who had been prisoners-of-war in Russia and wished to fight Germany with the aim of securing a sovereign Czech nation in the post-war world. Their release was sanctioned by the

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<sup>21</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, 'Peace with Honour', Paris *Daily Mail*, 28 March 1922; quoted in Steed *Through Thirty Years*, *ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Crane was a member of a 1917 Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia, and a member of the American Section of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

<sup>23</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, *op.cit.*

<sup>24</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>25</sup> 'Memorandum regarding allied war stores lying at Archangel', US National Archives, Foreign Affairs Branch, Petrograd Embassy, 800 File; March 20, 1918.

<sup>26</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 21.

Bolshevik regime and the Americans and Japanese were responsible for their transport by rail to Vladivostok. They were to become a major catalyst in the eruption of the Civil War as they fell afoul firstly of the Soviets, and finally with the White Russian leader Admiral Kolchak, ending with the giving over of Kolchak to the Soviets by his Czech 'protectors'.

General William S Graves, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, explained:

It should be remembered that the main reason advanced by those interested in military intervention in Siberia, was the immediate and urgent need for protection of the Czechs who were supposed to be trying to get through Siberia to Vladivostok and then to the Western front where they could join the Allies.<sup>28</sup>

The position of the Bolsheviks in regard to Germany was at the time by no means clear, as indicated by the release of the anti-German Czech soldiers. Robert Service states that 'most Bolshevik leaders... thought that a separate peace with the Central Powers was an insufferable concession to capitalist imperialism'.<sup>29</sup> The Bolsheviks were amenable to dealings with the Allies if there were assurances of help in the event of a German invasion. Despite Lenin's directions, Trotsky as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had instead of signing a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, called for a revolution against Germany, and with Trotsky's intransigence the armistice broke, with the Germans launching another offensive on the Eastern Front, where they now fought the unprepared Red Army. This caused a sense of 'solidarity' between the Soviets and the Allied representatives.<sup>30</sup> The British, via War Cabinet special agent R H Bruce Lockhart, sought out Trotsky on the instruction so Lloyd George. So close were Lockhart and Trotsky to become that Lockhart's wife commented that he was getting the reputation as a 'Red' among his colleagues in Britain.

Trotsky's parting words to Lockhart at their first meeting at the Smolny were: 'Now is the big opportunity for the Allied Governments.' Thereafter Lockhart saw Trotsky on a daily basis.<sup>31</sup> Lockhart stated that Trotsky was willing to bring Soviet Russia over to Britain:

He considered that war was inevitable. If the Allies would send a promise of support, he informed me that he would sway the decision of the Government in favour of war. I sent several telegrams to London requesting an official message that would enable me to strengthen Trotsky's hands. No message was sent.<sup>32</sup>

From the US side, 'Major' Thomas D Thacher, a Wall Street lawyer in Russia working under the guise of the American Red Cross Mission organised by 'Colonel'

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<sup>28</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920* (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), 'Aid to the Czechs'.

<sup>29</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography* (Oxford: Pan Books, 23009), p. 210.

<sup>30</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>31</sup> R H Bruce Lockhart, *British Agent* (London: G P Putnam's Sons, 1933), Book Four, 'History From the Inside', Chapter 3.

<sup>32</sup> R H Bruce Lockhart, *British Agent*, *Ibid.*, Chapter 3. The failure of Britain to respond, despite Lloyd George's eagerness to deal with the Soviet regime, would indicate the dichotomy that existed within the Allied Governments regarding how the Soviets should be dealt with; particularly with the intransigent anti-Bolshevik position of Winston Churchill.

William B Thompson,<sup>33</sup> was dispatched to Murmansk by Red Cross Mission leader ‘Colonel’ Raymond Robbins to report the local situation to Thompson,<sup>34</sup> by then back in the USA, full of enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks,<sup>35</sup> and offering a million dollars of his own money to fund Bolshevik propaganda among the Germans and Austrians.<sup>36</sup> Thacher wrote a Memorandum for submission via J P Morgan partner Dwight W Morrow, who was then a partner in the Thacher firm, to be given to the British, in which Thacher recommended: ‘...the fullest assistance should be given to the Soviet Government in its efforts to organize a volunteer revolutionary army’.<sup>37</sup>

The pro-Bolshevik efforts of both William B Thompson and his deputy Raymond Robins were favourably noticed by General William V Judson of the US Army, who recommended both for the Distinguished Service Medal ‘for their effective work with Bolshevism’.<sup>38</sup>

With unwarranted fears of a German and possibly Finnish anti-Bolshevik attack on Murmansk, the Murmansk Soviet telegraphed the Petrograd Soviet that they were preparing for the defence of Murmansk and the railway, describing the attitude of the missions of the ‘friendly powers’, the French, British and Americans, as ‘inalterably well inclined towards us’, and prepared to provide any wherewithal, from food to weapons.<sup>39</sup> Believing that negotiations for a peace treaty between Germany and Russia at Brest-Litovsk had broken down and that there would be an impending German advance on Petrograd, Trotsky’s response was to state to the Murmansk Soviet that, ‘You must accept any and all assistance from the Allied missions’ and use any means to obstruct the German advance.<sup>40</sup>

With the belief in a German attack the Allied missions formulated a program that included the recognition of the Soviet as the supreme political authority in Murmansk, and the creation of a military council comprising one representative each from the French, British and Soviet.<sup>41</sup> On this basis, Allied forces landed in Murmansk to support the Soviets. Kennan notes that this was probably the first Allied landing of forces on Russian territory, and it was undertaken at the invitation of the local Soviet authorities.<sup>42</sup> American military involvement in Murmansk proceeded on the basis of being suspicious of British interests,<sup>43</sup> not in opposition to Bolshevism.

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<sup>33</sup> Thompson, a copper magnate, financier and Board member of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, had organised the American Red Cross Mission to go to Russia in 1917 in the wake of the March 1917 Revolution, at first supporting the Provisional Government, and then the Bolsheviks. The real purpose of the Red Cross Mission can be deduced from the composition being largely comprised of business representatives and Wall Street lawyers rather than medical personnel. See: Antony C Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, op. cit., Chapter 5: ‘The American Red Cross Mission in Russia – 1917’, pp. 71-88.

<sup>34</sup> George Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>35</sup> ‘Bolsheviki Will Not Make Separate Peace: Only Those Who Made Up Privileged Classes Under Czar Would Do So, Says Col. W B Thompson, Just Back From Red Cross Mission’, *The New York Times*, January 27, 1918. Thompson was good-naturedly known among his peers as ‘The Bolshevik of Wall Street’.

<sup>36</sup> ‘Gives Bolsheviki a Million’, *Washington Post*, 2 February 2, 1918.

<sup>37</sup> Antony C Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, op. cit., p.95, citing the Memo in US State Department Decimal File, 316-13-698.

<sup>38</sup> US Adjutant General’s Office A.G. 095 Thompson Wm b 6/18/19. Cited by Sutton, *National Suicide*, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>39</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, op.cit., p. 45.

<sup>40</sup> Trotsky to the Murmansk Soviet, March 1, 1918; cited by George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>41</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>42</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>43</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 55.

In Vladivostok the Allied war supplies were four times the amount as that stored at Archangel.<sup>44</sup> In March 1918 Admiral Austin M Knight, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, landed in Vladivostok and reported to Washington that there was no danger of the Bolsheviki delivering the stores to the Germans.<sup>45</sup>

The Allies continued to hope for a Soviet pro-Allied response, and the acceptance of an Allied military presence in Russia. In April 1918 the Allied military attachés issued a declaration stating that Japan with the support of the other Allies should intervene in Russia to block Germany, but that this could only be undertaken with the support of the Bolsheviks. Allied contacts with Trotsky indicated that the Commissar for Military Affairs<sup>46</sup> would be amenable to Japanese intervention. There should also be Allied assistance in the reorganisation of the Red Army.<sup>47</sup>

### **Reasons for Allied Contact with Whites**

The threat of Admiral A V Kolchak to accept assistance from the Germans, despite his pro-British inclinations, if the Allies would not help him in his battle against the Soviet regime, accounts for Allied aid to the Whites rather than an anti-Bolshevik aim, but Wilson continued to resist intervention, despite British and French concern.<sup>48</sup>

Hope still rested on Bolshevik requests for assistance from the Allies, which would eliminate any reticence by Wilson, and Trotsky remained the focus of Allied lobbying, particularly by Bruce Lockhart.

Trotsky, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was by no means inclined towards Lenin's insistence that peace be sought at any price with Germany. Robert Service writes of this juncture: 'Diplomats and journalist of the great powers queued to interview [Trotsky] in his office in the Smolny Institute...'<sup>49</sup> While Trotsky's colleague Adolf Ioffe negotiated at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky continued to cultivate contacts with the Allied Powers. Service comments that,

...Trotsky and Bruce Lockhart met regularly and got on splendidly. Trotsky also made overtures to the French and the Americans in Petrograd. He formed a warm relationship with French military attaché Jacques Sadoul; he even asked America's Red Cross leader, Colonel Raymond Robins, to use his good offices to get the US Railway Mission... to give assistance to Sovnarkom.<sup>50</sup><sup>51</sup>

The relationship between Robins and Trotsky was, like that between Bruce Lockhart and Trotsky, cordial. Robins recalled 'winning Trotsky' to the Allied position. Trotsky stated to Robins that he was also anxious to keep war supplies out of the hands of the oncoming Germans, and immediately worked out a plan with Robins to safeguard the stocks.<sup>52</sup> However, under the insistence of Lenin, the Soviets also continued to pursue peace negotiations with Germany, much to Trotsky's chagrin,

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<sup>44</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>45</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>46</sup> Trotsky had resigned as Commissar for Foreign Affairs because of his opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and was persuaded to accept the post of Military Affairs.

<sup>47</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

<sup>48</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 345.

<sup>49</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

<sup>50</sup> Sovnarkom = Council of People's Commissars.

<sup>51</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

<sup>52</sup> William Harlan Hale, 'When the Red Storm Broke,' Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia: A Century and a Half of Dramatic Encounters* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), p. 154.

which saw him soon resign as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In the meantime, while he was obliged to deal with the Germans and Austrians, Trotsky appealed to Robins to, 'send your officers, American officers, Allied officers, any officers you please. I will give them full authority to enforce the embargo against goods into Germany all along our whole front.'<sup>53</sup>

General Judson, at the time one of the few men from American officialdom on the scene at Petrograd, agreed with Robins. This pro-Bolshevik attitude was at variance with US Ambassador Francis, who pursued his own policy of contacting the embryonic White Army.<sup>54</sup>

The Allied Governments had prevaricated, however, not certain as to the trustworthiness of the Bolsheviks, particularly since the German General Staff had facilitated the return of Lenin and his entourage to Russia.<sup>55</sup> From the opposite belligerents in the Great War, there is reason to believe that the British might have similarly facilitated Trotsky's return to Russia from New York in the hope of serving their interests.<sup>56</sup> While in New York Trotsky had stated that although the Russian people were 'war-weary' and desired peace they would not make a separate peace with Germany and did not wish to see Germany win.<sup>57</sup> The fear that the Bolsheviks were actually German agents seemed to many to have been proven by a collection of documents by American diplomat Edgar Sisson which purported to show that the Bolsheviks were virtually tools of the German High Command.<sup>58</sup> However, while the Germans encouraged certain Russian revolutionaries, what is even less known is the role the chief of British intelligence operations in the USA, William Wiseman, played in cultivating revolutionists for a pro-Allied course. It is only in recent years that much light has been thrown on this and on the activities of Trotsky leading up to his return to Russia in 1917. Professor Spence, states that:

It was the prospect of a Russian defection from the Allied cause, not revolution, that worried Wiseman and his superiors in London. Wiseman believed he could do something to prevent that occurrence. In the immediate wake of the [March] Revolution, he hatched a plan to mount a propaganda campaign from America aimed at influencing political currents in Russia. He hoped to counter German influence and 'guide the storm' by supporting the more responsible elements', including those of the revolutionary left, perhaps especially those. In this he might have been guided by [Sidney] Reilly's belief that the political contest in Russia was among rival variants of socialism, not revolution vs. reaction.<sup>59</sup> By mid-April Wiseman acknowledged contact with 'anarchist revolutionary socialists' in New York and was encouraging them,

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<sup>53</sup> William Harlan Hale, 'When the Red Storm Broke,' *ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>54</sup> William Harlan Hale, 'When the Red Storm Broke,' *ibid.*, pp. 155-156.

<sup>55</sup> Michael Pearson, *The Sealed Train: Journey to Revolution: Lenin – 1917* (London: Macmillan, 1975).

<sup>56</sup> While en route from New York to Russia to 'complete the revolution', Trotsky was detained at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, by the local British authorities who suspected him of being a German agent.

<sup>57</sup> 'Calls People War Weary. But Leo Trotsky Says They Do Not Want Separate Peace', *New York Times*, March 16, 1917.

<sup>58</sup> Edgar Sisson, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy: A Report by Edgar Sisson, Special Representative in Russia*, War Information Series, No. 20, October 1918, (Washington: Committee on Public Information, 1918).

<sup>59</sup> This is also an interesting comment in regard to Reilly, the so-called 'British Ace of Spies', usually simplistically portrayed as anti-Soviet.

with financial incentive, to write comrades in Russia and lobby against pacifist, defeatist tendencies. An overriding concern was that this support be kept secret; the British hand was not to be visible in any respect.

Trotsky was anti-war, but was not a defeatist; not pro-ally, but neither pro-German, and he was opposed to the most immediate danger, a separate peace. This clearly separated him from the likes of Lenin who was indeed backed by the Germans. Given his strong influence in revolutionary circles, Trotsky would have been an ideal asset for Wiseman's scheme. If Wiseman did not try to recruit him, he certainly should have.<sup>60</sup>

Spence states that Wiseman in a report, 'Intelligence and Propaganda Work in Russia', alludes to 'one of our agents from America... a well-known international socialist... at once accepted into the Bolshevics [sic] circles and admitted to their conferences...' Spence suggests that this 'agent' could have been Trotsky.<sup>61</sup> The description seems to fit well. Spence also suggests the possibility that Trotsky's brief detention by the British authorities at Halifax could have served as a ruse to throw any suspicion from Trotsky's use by the British.

With the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk withdrawing Russia from the war against Germany, an added worry for the Allies was the freeing of 1,600,000 mostly Austrian prisoners-of-war in Russia, and particularly in Siberia. US Secretary of State Robert Lansing for the first time argued in favour of Allied –specifically Japanese - intervention, for the purpose, not of overthrowing Bolshevism but of ensuring Russian authority in Siberia.<sup>62</sup> However President Wilson did not yet think the time was right for such a policy. There were however already both American and Japanese ships anchored off Vladivostok. When the local Bolsheviks seized power in March 1918 the only concern of the Americans was the brief interruption in telegraphic services. These were soon restored.<sup>63</sup>

While the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers was ratified by the Soviets in March 1918, with Trotsky in the event resigning his position as Commissar for Foreign Affairs,<sup>64</sup> the intentions of the Germans towards Russia were uncertain. The Bolsheviks continued to put out feelers towards the Allies. Service writes:

[Trotsky] continued to talk to representatives of the Western Allies and on 5 March, only a couple of days after the signing of the separate peace, he asked the Americans whether they would give assistance in the event that Sovnarkom chose to go to war against Germany. The Bolsheviks knew they could not fight unaided. Trotsky was eager to keep up such contact since he still believed the Brest-Litovsk treaty a mistake. He was willing to resume operations against the Germans. Allied diplomats and officers in Moscow understood this and very readily talked to him...<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Richard B Spence, University of Idaho, 'Interrupted Journey: British Intelligence and the Arrest of Leon Trotsky April 1917', *Revolutionary Russia*, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 2000.

<sup>61</sup> Richard B Spence, 'Interrupted Journey', *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1940), Vol. 2, p. 358.

<sup>63</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>64</sup> Trotsky assumed the position of People's Commissar for Military Affairs.

<sup>65</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

While the British had sent troops to Archangel to guard military supplies, and the French had landed in Odessa, Trotsky utilised his contacts with Lockhart, Sadoul and Robins to seek Allied assistance in reorganizing the Red Army, which was in disarray. He employed Captain G A Hill of the British Special Intelligence Service to organise the air force. Robert Service points out that Trotsky did not mention anything of this in his memoirs.<sup>66</sup> The legend of a Bolshevik struggle against ‘reactionaries’ who were backed by the capitalist, imperialist powers, had to be maintained as one of the central myths of the Soviet regime.

In April 1918 British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, on the basis of encouraging reports from Lockhart, suggested joint Allied intervention in co-operation with the Soviets.<sup>67</sup> Colonel William Wiseman of the British Secret Service was of the same opinion, cabling President Wilson’s confidante ‘Colonel’ Edward House from London on May 1 1918 that the Allies should intervene at the invitation of the Bolsheviks and help organise the Red Army<sup>68</sup>, which was already fighting anti-Soviet forces.

However, the Allies remained unsure of the reliability of Soviet attitudes, and were cautious about the possibility of alienating the many factions vying for control of Russia at a time when the Soviet sphere of authority was still small and precarious. In particular the Socialist Revolutionaries remained a major factor politically, and it is incorrect to perceive the anti-Soviet forces as representing capitalism or a return to Czarism. Also at the time Ataman Semenoff’s anti-Bolshevik Cossacks were successfully pushing through Siberia, and it might transpire that this force would be the best option for blocking a German invasion.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, it was out of caution in regard to alienating factions and thereby serving Germany that Balfour favoured Allied intervention with Soviet support while refraining from recognising the Bolshevik regime diplomatically.<sup>70</sup> US Secretary of State Lansing expressed concern that if the Allies sided with Reds or Whites ‘we would probably find ourselves in hot water’.<sup>71</sup>

On the other hand, there was a danger that if the Bolsheviks invited Allied intervention the Germans would occupy Moscow and Petrograd and the Bolshevik regime would fall. This was the opinion expressed by Wiseman to Edward House.<sup>72</sup> The Allied presence in Murmansk and Archangel were now causes of concern for the Germans who raised the issue in the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, although the actual Allied presence was insignificant.<sup>73</sup>

In early 1918 American munitions from Archangel were shipped to the Bolsheviks, Raymond Robins informing US Ambassador Francis:

Munitions that are being evacuated from Archangel are sent to Moscow, the Urals and Siberian towns. Soviet government desires to take up the matter of

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<sup>66</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>67</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

<sup>68</sup> Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co.), Vol. III, p.421.

<sup>69</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>70</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>71</sup> George F Kennan, *ibid.*, *The Decision to Intervene*, p. 350.

<sup>72</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>73</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 370.

payment for these munitions, and expects to pay for them in raw materials, but asks for time to reorganize the economic resources of the country.<sup>74</sup>

### **Civil War**

The catalyst for the outbreak of hostilities involved a dispute between the Czechs and the Soviets. By agreement with the Allies, Trotsky had allowed the Czech prisoners-of-war to leave Russia and join the Allies fighting the Germans in France. *En route* along the Trans-Siberian railway an order came from Trotsky for the Czechs to hand over their weapons. The Czechs believed this to be of treacherous intent and a revolt broke out in May, the Czechs turning back into Russia and on reaching Samara on the River Volga offered their services to the Socialist-Revolutionary 'Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly', a rival Government formed on the basis that the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries had won more seats to the Consequent Assembly than the Bolsheviks and were thus the legally elected Government of Russia. The battle-hardened Czechs defeated the Red Army and the entire Volga region came under the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Russia was in disarray with industrial strikes, peasant resistance, and opposition to the Bolsheviks ranging from anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries to liberals and Czarists. Additionally fighting soon broke out between the Bolsheviks and their partners, the *Left* Socialist-Revolutionaries.<sup>75</sup> The Bolshevik regime, which had not extended far beyond Petrograd and Moscow, was ripe for defeat.

After months of procrastination, American troops landed in Siberia and North Russia in July 1918, without advising the French and British who had been pushing for decisive action. Here Admiral A V Kolchak had formed a White Army.

Encouraged by Allied troop landings an anti-Bolshevik *coup* in Archangel succeeded in driving out the Soviets. A small American force led by a lieutenant chased the Soviets for seventy-five miles south along the Archangel-Vologda railroad. However, it is important to realise that military engagement against the Bolsheviks contravened US policy, and such actions were undertaken by enthusiastic military men at the scene, in disregard for Wilson's directive of *not* engaging the Red Army.

### **Graves in Russia**

In September General William S Graves arrived in Vladivostok to take over command of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. Graves maintained an antagonistic attitude towards the White movement for the entirety of his service in Siberia. From the start Graves' attitude towards the White movement was one of contempt, the commander later sneeringly writing of the officers:

At the time of my arrival in Vladivostok, when the Allied representatives spoke of Russians, they meant the old Czarist officials, who felt it was then safe enough for them to appear in their gorgeous uniforms every evening, and parade down Svetlanskaya, the principal thoroughfare.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Raymond Robins to Ambassador Francis, April 4, 1918. Cited by Antony C Sutton, *National Suicide*, op.cit., p. 76.

<sup>75</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, op. cit., p. 220. The 'Left Socialist Revolutionaries' were an originally pro-Bolshevik faction that had broken away from the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries over the issue of supporting the Bolsheviks.

<sup>76</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Before the Armistice'.

Kolchak had staged a *coup* against the governing 'Directorate' with the encouragement of British commander, General Knox. Graves saw this as nothing other than a revival of Czarist 'autocracy', and Graves makes the claim that the Kolchak Government treated the war-weary peasants with brutality because of their lack of desire to take up arms for any faction.<sup>77</sup> It is noticeable that even in 1931, when Graves' wrote his reminisces of the 'Siberian adventure', there is not a single reference to the 'Red Terror' or any criticism of the Bolsheviks. Rather, Graves emphasises the 'autocratic' nature of the Kolchak regime without a word about the character of the Soviet regime, even with the advantage of hindsight over a decade later:

No one in Siberia, excepting those belonging to the Kolchak supporters, enjoyed any of the boons of modern civilization, such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of legal action, which are well-recognized heritages of all civilized people.<sup>78</sup>

Graves' hatred of Semenoff seems to have been even more intense than the hatred he had towards Kolchak, years later expressing his indignation that a representative of the Cossack Ataman had been permitted entry into the USA in 1919 to lecture on the situation in Siberia from the White perspective.<sup>79</sup>

General Gayda, commander of the Czech soldiers in Siberia, urged Graves to support Kolchak and to assist the Czechs and the White armies to destroy Bolshevism, and had a plan to march on Moscow. According to the pro-Soviet American authors Sayers and Kahn, citing Graves, the American commander told Gayda that 'as long as he was in command no American soldiers would be used against the Bolsheviks'.<sup>80</sup> Sayers and Kahn quote Graves as concluding soon after his arrival in Vladivostok:

The word 'Bolshevik', as used in Siberia, covers most of the Russian people and to use troops to fight Bolsheviks or to arm, equip, feed, clothe or pay White Russians to fight them was utterly inconsistent with 'non-interference with the internal affairs of Russia'.<sup>81</sup>

Graves was to write of his refusal to act against the Bolsheviks that this was in strict accord with his orders:

The United States never entered into a state of war with Russia, or any faction of Russia. It was equally as unconstitutional to use American troops in hostile action in Siberia against any faction of Russia, as it would have been to send them to Russia with a view to using them in hostile action against the Russians. If I had permitted American troops to be used in fighting 'Red armies,' as stated, I would have taken an immense responsibility upon myself, as no one above me, in authority, had given me any such orders. The fact that I did not permit American troops to be so used was responsible for nine-tenths of the criticism directed against us, while in Siberia. I was told by General

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<sup>77</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, *ibid.*, 'After the Armistice'.

<sup>78</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, *ibid.*, 'After the Armistice'.

<sup>79</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, *ibid.*, 'After the Armistice'.

<sup>80</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia* (London: Collet's Holdings, 1946), p. 64.

<sup>81</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, *ibid.*, p. 65.

Leonard Wood, upon my return from the Far East in December, 1920, that if I did not have copies of my papers I would be 'torn limb from limb, in the United States, because I did not take part in fighting bolshevism.'<sup>82</sup>

The attitude of Graves was alarming to Britain's General Knox, who was one of those among the Allies on the scene who did genuinely want to defeat Bolshevism, and he expressed concern to Graves that the American General already had a pro-Soviet reputation.<sup>83</sup>

### **'Bolshevistic Americans'**

To many Russians the Americans who came to their land seemed to be imbued with a Bolshevistic attitude. The ideals of Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' for post-war world re-organisation could be interpreted as having a Bolshevistic ideology, not only by Russian 'autocrats' but by conservatives throughout the world. Wilson's blueprint was certainly intended to destroy the traditional order of Europe. Additionally, America's originally pro-Russian sentiments had long been soured by the anti-Czarist output of journalist George Kennan.<sup>84</sup> Perhaps Americans could more readily identify with the Bolsheviks and other socialist revolutionaries because of their own revolutionary and anti-monarchical tradition. Their President, Woodrow Wilson, touted as a great idealist, although surrounded by the 'vested interests' he feigned to denounce,<sup>85</sup> stated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in terms reminiscent of the Bolsheviks:

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<sup>82</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Before the Armistice'.

<sup>83</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>84</sup> Not to be confused with a relative, George F Kennan, the US State Department strategist and expert on Russia, cited in this paper.

Kennan, the journalist had been funded by Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Co., one of those bankers who, according to H Wickham Steed, were eager for the recognition of the Soviet regime at the 1919 Paris conference. Schiff had provided the money for Kennan to distribute revolutionary propaganda to Russian prisoners-of-war in Japan during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, these revolutionised soldiers providing the cadres for the first anti-Czarist revolution in 1905, and for the 1917 Revolution.

According to Robert Cowley, editor of *American Heritage*, 'An American journalist, George Kennan, became the first to reveal the full horrors of Siberian exile and the brutal, studied inhumanity of Czarist "justice"', and as having exposed the allegedly 'brutal police state', the 'deep seated sickness of an entire nation'. During the years following the American Civil War there had been 'a kind of golden age' of Russo-American relations, and 'scarcely blemished good-fellowship'. The anti-Czarist publicity began when *Century Magazine* published 'a long and highly sensationalised' series of articles by Kennan, who had spent two years in Siberia. These articles formed the basis of his book *Siberia and the Exile System*, which Cowley states 'were devastating in their effect' on American attitudes towards Russia. The book became what Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet under Stalin, years later described as 'a kind of "Bible" to his generation of revolutionaries'. Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, op. cit., Robert Cowley, 'A Year in Hell', pp. 93-121.

Conversely, the descriptions of the Russian prison system and Siberian exile for even the Czar's most avid opponents seem relatively enlightened and humane for the times when reading of the treatment meted out to Trotsky and his comrades, as related in Robert Service's recent biography of Trotsky. Certainly Trotsky was accorded better treatment than that provided for by the system he established under Bolshevism. Trotsky was even accorded conjugal rights when in jail. Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, op. cit., pp. 50-95.

<sup>85</sup> Wilson's confidante, Edward House, had during the war founded a think tank called 'The Inquiry' which after the war transformed into the Council on Foreign Relations, to advise on post-war policy. The CFR was, and remains, an influential nexus between businessmen and international bankers, politicians, and academics. See the official CFR history: Peter Grose, *Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*. < <http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/>>

There is throughout the world the feeling of revolt against vested interests which influence the world in both economic and political spheres. The way to cure this domination is, in my opinion, constant discussion and a slow process of reform; but the world at large has grown impatient of delay. There are men in the United States of the finest temper, if not of the finest judgment, who are in sympathy with Bolshevism because it appears to them to offer that regime of opportunity to the individual which they desire to bring about.<sup>86</sup>

Hence, President Wilson had given the moral high ground to the Soviets. Wilson went further, and on his post-war sojourn to Europe unsuccessfully tried to speak with revolutionary rhetoric to crowds in Italy and France.<sup>87</sup> Wilson was aiming to create his own liberal-democratic 'world revolution' that could accommodate socialist revolutionaries of all types, including Bolsheviks.

Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' to reorganise the world amounted to a revolutionary manifesto that gave notice to the old European order that America would lead the new. Explicating the ideology behind the 'Fourteen Points' it was stated in terms that seemed to coincide with the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks and would give reason for concern by the British, French and other colonial powers, that:

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.<sup>88</sup>

The Wilsonian manifesto was a call for anti-imperialist solidarity led by America, against the powers that the US had supposedly entered the war to assist, and could easily be interpreted as including the Bolsheviks as comrades in a world anti-imperialist struggle.

With this US pro-revolutionist, anti-Czarist attitude in mind, while many were concerned at the sadism of the Reds, Graves' subordinates were bringing him daily intelligence reports on alleged White atrocities, and Graves expressed his abhorrence,<sup>89</sup> yet feigned ignorance as to the 'Red Terror'. The pro-Bolshevik attitude among the Americans was noted by the White Russian press in Siberia, Graves complaining that the White press was describing the Americans as being 'Bolshevistic', and White Russian reports from Vladivostok to Kolchak at Omsk warned that, 'The United States Soldiers are infected with Bolshevism'.<sup>90</sup>

### **General Graves' Antagonism Towards Kolchak**

Of General Ivanoff-Rinoff, one of Kolchak's commanders, whom Graves was to describe as the "Dictator of Eastern Siberia",<sup>91</sup> Graves stated to British High Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot, that, 'As far as I'm concerned the people could bring

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<sup>86</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>87</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Woodrow Wilson, 'Fourteen Points', January 8, 1918.

<sup>89</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

<sup>90</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'After the Armistice'.

<sup>91</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, ibid., 'Mobilization of Russian Troops'.

Ivanoff-Rinoff opposite American headquarters and hang him to that telephone pole until he is dead – and not an American would turn his hand!’<sup>92</sup>

Graves’ characterisation of the Kolchak Government was that of ‘a crowd of reactionaries’, and Ivanoff-Rinoff was a ‘typical Russian Czarist official’. These were the types of description Graves was dispatching to the US War Office.<sup>93</sup>

The antagonism between Graves and the White Russian press was to result in Graves’ demand that Kolchak stifle the press, despite the supposed policy of ‘non-interference’ (sic) and Graves’ supposed moral indignation at the ‘autocratic’ nature of the Kolchak regime, whose restrictions in regard to ‘free speech’ so enraged him. In retaliation over the White Russian criticism of him and the Americans in general, Graves withheld 14,000 desperately needed rifles from Kolchak’s forces, which had been bought and paid for by the White movement.<sup>94</sup>

When the American Red Cross, as a private agency, under the direction of Dr Teusler, whom Graves slanders as having ‘no sympathy for the aspirations of the Russian people’, was found to be providing Kolchak’s forces with warm underwear, and running hospitals for Kolchak, Graves put Teusler on notice that no further goods would be available for Red Cross trains unless this support ceased.<sup>95</sup>

Another example of American ‘non-interference’ was the efforts made to undermine Kalmikoff, Graves insisting that the Japanese disarm the Ussuri Cossack Ataman, writing to Japanese Headquarters, ‘that the excesses of Kalmikoff should be stopped and that his actions were a disgrace to civilization....’<sup>96</sup>

Indignantly replying to the US Military Attaché in Tokyo in regard to allegations that American deserters had joined the Red Army<sup>97</sup> and that the US had stood by while Japanese forces had been attacked by the Reds, Graves stated: ‘There is not a man in the bolshevik, or any other army, worse than Kalmikoff’.<sup>98</sup>

### **Red Atrocities Ignored**

Yet in his condemnation of Ivanoff-Rinoff, Kolchak, Semenoff, Kalmikoff and others, Graves could not have been unaware of the atrocities being committed by the Reds. The so-called ‘Red Terror’ included forms of sadism that have the symptoms of mass psychosis, and were being reported both in the Western press and in dispatches by Allies on the scene.

After Denikin’s White forces defeated the Bolsheviks at Odessa in August 1919, Rev. R Courtier-Forster, Chaplain of the British forces at Odessa and the Black Sea ports, who had been held captive by the Bolsheviks, reported the horrors of Bolshevism, relating how on the ship *Sinope*, the largest cruiser of the Black Sea Fleet, some of his personal friends had been chained to planks and slowly pushed into the ship’s furnaces to be roasted alive. Others were scolded with steam from the ship’s boilers. Mass rapes were committed, while the local Soviet press debated the possibilities of nationalising women. The screams from women being raped, and from other victims in what Rev. Courtier-Forster called the ‘Bolshevik’s House of Torture’ at Catherine Square, could be heard for blocks around, while at Catherine Square the

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<sup>92</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, op. cit., p 69.

<sup>93</sup> William S Graves, *America’s Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., ‘Mobilization of Russian Troops’.

<sup>94</sup> See below.

<sup>95</sup> William S Graves, *America’s Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., ‘The Railroad Agreement’.

<sup>96</sup> William S Graves, *America’s Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., ‘After the Armistice’.

<sup>97</sup> Graves insisted that the Japanese could not know that American deserters had joined the Bolsheviks, but wrote also that he did not know their whereabouts either. William S Graves, *America’s Siberian Adventure*, *ibid.*, ‘Mobilization of Russian Troops’.

<sup>98</sup> William S Graves, *America’s Siberian Adventure*, *ibid.*, ‘Mobilization of Russian Troops’.

Bolsheviks tried to muffle the screams with the noise of lorries thundering up and down the street.<sup>99</sup>

Lenin used the Allied intervention as a rationalisation for the 'Red Terror' stating in 1919 that, 'The Terror was forced on us by the Entente'.<sup>100</sup> However the plan for a 'Red Terror' was already drafted on the orders of Lenin in December 1917 for the *Cheka*, the secret political police.<sup>101</sup> The People's Commissary for the Interior, Ptervosky, sent a communiqué to all Soviets not to flinch from the 'mass execution by shooting' of hostages to achieve their aims.<sup>102</sup> Of the Civil War period, Melgunoff states that the number of 'hostages' shot by the Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1918 cannot be estimated.<sup>103</sup> The number of victims of the Bolsheviks in South Russia during the period 1918-1919, was estimated by the Denikin Commission to be 1,700,000, a total with which Melgunoff concurs.<sup>104</sup>

When the Rohrberg Commission of Enquiry entered Kiev, after the Soviets had been driven out in August 1919, it described the 'execution hall' of the *Cheka* as follows:

All the cement floor of the great garage (the execution hall of the departmental Cheka of Kief) was flooded with blood. This blood was no longer flowing, it formed a layer of several inches: it was a horrible mixture of blood, brains, of pieces of skull, of tufts of hair and other human remains. All the walls were bespattered with blood; pieces of brains and scalps were sticking to them. A gutter twenty-five centimetres wide by twenty-five centimetres deep and about ten metres long ran from the centre of the garage towards a subterranean drain. This gutter along its whole length was full to the top with blood...Usually as soon as the massacre had taken place the bodies were conveyed out of the town in motor lorries and buried beside the grave about which we have spoken; we found in a corner of the garden another grave which was older and contained about eighty bodies. Here we discovered on the bodies traces of cruelties and mutilations the most varied and unimaginable. Some bodies were disembowelled, others had limbs chopped off, some were literally hacked to pieces. Some had their eyes put out and the head, face, neck and trunk covered with deep wounds. Further on we found a corpse with a wedge driven into the chest. Some had no tongues. In a corner of the grave we discovered a certain quantity of arms and legs....<sup>105</sup>

The nature of Bolshevism was understood in the West by the time Graves took command of the Americans in Siberia. However, of the leaders of the major powers only France's Clemenceau desired to see the elimination of Bolshevism, and introduced Wilson and Lloyd George to eyewitnesses in regard to the 'Red Terror'. Wilson however would not be moved by the testimony.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> R. Courtier-Forster, 'Bolshevism, Reign of Torture at Odessa', *London Times*, December 3, 1919, pp. 2, 3, 4.

<sup>100</sup> S Melgunoff, 'The Record of the Red Terror', p. 198.

<<http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/soviet/redterror.pdf>>

<sup>101</sup> S Melgunoff, 'The Record of the Red Terror', *ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>102</sup> S Melgunoff, 'The Record of the Red Terror', *ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>103</sup> S Melgunoff, 'The Record of the Red Terror', *ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>104</sup> S Melgunoff, 'The Record of the Red Terror', *ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>105</sup> S Melgunoff, *Larreur rouge* (Paris, 1927), cited by Vicomte Leon de Poncins, *The Secret Powers Behind Revolution* (California: Christian Book Club of America, n.d.), p. 149.

<sup>106</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

Amidst the numerous accusations by Graves regarding White atrocities, the only comment he makes on the 'Red Terror' is that:

The foreign press was constantly being told that the Bolsheviks were the Russians who were committing these terrible excesses, and propaganda had been used to such an extent that no one ever believed that atrocities were being committed against the Bolsheviks.<sup>107</sup>

While Graves might have pleaded ignorance when he took command of the American forces in Siberia, these statements were made in his book *America's Siberian Expedition* published in 1931, and by that time there could be no excuse for ignorance, other than that of an apologist for Bolshevism.

### **'Very largely our fault'**

In March 1919 Captain Montgomery Schuyler, Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, reporting from Omsk to Lt. Colonel Barrows in Vladivostok, wrote of his misgivings:

...You will feel I am being hot about this matter but it is I feel sure, one which is going to bring great trouble on the United States when the judgment of history shall be recorded on the part we have played. It is very largely our fault that Bolshevism has spread as it has and I do not believe we will be found guiltless of the thousands of lives uselessly and cruelly sacrificed in wild orgies of bloodshed to establish an autocratic and despotic rule of principles which have been rejected by every generation of mankind which has dabbled with them.<sup>108</sup>

In the same month as Captain Schuyler was writing his report which confirms the widespread White Russian assertions, much to Graves ongoing outrage, that the Americans were pursuing a policy helpful to Bolshevism, Graves cabled Washington to ensure that his actions were in accord with the US Administration. General March, Chief of Staff of the US War Department, replied: '...Your action as reported in the cablegram was in accordance with your original instructions and is approved, and you will be guided by those instructions until they are modified by the President...'<sup>109</sup>

Wilson had urged 'evacuation of all Russian territory' by foreign troops as the sixth of his 'Fourteen Points', which would hardly encourage confidence among the White movement in regard to the intentions of the USA, the implications of Wilson's statement again being pro-Soviet:

The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself

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<sup>107</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Kolchak and Recognition'.

<sup>108</sup> Capt. Montgomery Schuyler, Report of March 1, 1919, Record Group 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Forces, 383.9 Military Intelligence Report, p. 2.

<sup>109</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Mobilization of Russian Troops'.

desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.<sup>110</sup>

Therefore, when authorising American troops to enter Russia, Wilson stated of the US forces in North Russia at the time of their landing that,

Military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it... Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which the American or Allied troops can be employed... is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence.<sup>111</sup>

This was at variance with the British military's understanding of the meaning of intervention, and the British military, which had command of the Allied Supreme War Council, wished to pursue an anti-Bolshevik policy, albeit at variance with Prime Minister Lloyd George. They had supported an anti-Soviet *coup* in Archangel the following month (August). Hence, there was no common agreement as to the meaning of intervention, and Allied military action against the Red Army was more likely to arise from the initiative of Allied officers on the scene. This is acknowledged by Kennan when he writes of the *coup* in Archangel:

That the participants in this happy escapade had any knowledge of the President's recent expression of unwillingness to have American troops participate in organized intervention into the interior from Murmansk and Archangel, or that it would have meant much to them had they known it, seems doubtful in the extreme.<sup>112</sup>

### **Japanese Factor**

Although both Trotsky and Allied military attachés were urging Japanese assistance in the intervention,<sup>113</sup> Japanese aims in Russia's Far East became problematic to the Allies.

Kolchak had established his Government in Omsk, but was opposed by pro-Japanese officers, and by the powerful Cossack Ataman, Semenoff, who had established his domain in the Far East with Japanese support. The Western Allies became aware of Japan's intentions of keeping the region destabilised and of preventing a stable, united Russian authority, which was the aim of Kolchak, who was recognised by most of the other White leaders as the 'Supreme Ruler of All the Russias'. As early as 1918 US military intelligence had reported that the Japanese did not desire a stable order in Russia since this would eliminate the need for Japanese intervention under the pretext of maintaining stability.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Woodrow Wilson, 'Fourteen Points', January 8, 1918.

<sup>111</sup> Woodrow Wilson, July 17, 1918. Cited by E M Halliday, 'Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night,' Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, op.cit., p. 166.

<sup>112</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, op. cit., p. 425.

<sup>113</sup> George F Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene*, *ibid.*, p. 120

<sup>114</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak 1918-1920* (New York: University of Cambridge, 1996), p. 192.

The pro-British Kolchak's position was precarious in regard to Japanese-backed rival White leaders, such as Semenoff and Kalmikoff. The Japanese were seeking to establish their dominion over the Russian Far East and to keep Britain and America out.<sup>115</sup> The White forces were caught between the Red Army and inter-Allied post-war rivalry. This was a factor for an American business syndicate, with the support of the US Administration, being able to negotiate a concession from the Soviet regime over the Kamchatka Peninsula.

In 1920, when the Allies were ostensibly in Vladivostok to assist the Whites, an American businessman, Washington Vanderlip, representing a consortium of US business interests *and the US Government*, was negotiating a concession with Lenin for what would have virtually made the whole area a protectorate of the USA. This involved a sixty-year lease of the Far Eastern Kamchatka Peninsula to secure important oil and mining concessions<sup>116</sup>.

The British novelist, historian, and Fabian-socialist H G Wells, in Russia at the time to interview Lenin and other Bolshevik luminaries, met Vanderlip and expressed the hope that the USA and commercial interests would sustain Bolshevism:

The only Power capable of playing this role of eleventh-hour helper to Russia single-handed is the United States of America. That is why I find the adventure of the enterprising and imaginative Mr. Vanderlip very significant. I doubt the conclusiveness of his negotiations; they are probably only the opening phase of a discussion of the Russian problem upon a new basis that may lead it at last to a comprehensive world treatment of this situation. Other Powers than the United States will, in the present phase of world-exhaustion, need to combine before they can be of any effective use to Russia. Big business is by no means antipathetic to Communism. The larger big business grows the more it approximates to Collectivism. It is the upper road of the few instead of the lower road of the masses to Collectivism.<sup>117</sup>

Vanderlip embarked on his mission at a time when the Soviets did not yet control the region, and undertook the trip with the authority of the US State Department. Lenin explained the lease to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 21, 1920, replying to a question on the possibility of war with Japan, that Soviet Russia was now in a position to fight Japan with the help of America, and that '...an attack by Japan on Soviet Russia is much more difficult now than it was a year ago'.<sup>118</sup> Hence, the lease was intended to serve both Soviet and US geopolitical interests. Lenin, writing to Vanderlip in 1921, expressed the importance the Soviet regime attached to the lease:

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<sup>115</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, *ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>116</sup> "The Vanderlip Concession, an alternate history", 26 December 2009, <<http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/the-vanderlip-concession-an-alternate-history-1626435.html>>

<sup>117</sup> H G Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, Chapter VII, 'The Envoy'. Wells went to Russia in September 1920 at the invitation of Kamenev, of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, one of the leaders of the Bolshevik regime. *Russia in the Shadows* appeared as a series of articles in *The Sunday Express*. The whole book can be read online at: [gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602371h.html](http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602371h.html)

<sup>118</sup> Lenin, December 21, 1920, Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, 'Reply To The Debate On The Report On Concessions Delivered To The R.C.P.(B.) Group At The Eighth Congress Of Soviets', *Lenin: Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), Vol. 42, pp. 239-267.

I thank you for your kind letter of the 14th, and am very glad to hear of President Harding's favourable views as to our trade with America. You know what value we attach to our future American business relations. We fully recognise the part played in this respect by your syndicate and also the great importance of your personal efforts. Your new proposals are highly interesting and I have asked the Supreme Council of National Economy to report to me at short intervals about the progress of the negotiations. You can be sure that we will treat every reasonable suggestion with the greatest attention and care. It is on production and trade that our efforts are principally concentrated and your help is to us of the greatest value.<sup>119</sup>

At the time the 'ownership' of Kamchatka was not even known to Lenin, but the Japanese were in possession, and did not withdraw until signing a Treaty with Soviet Russia in 1925. Lenin pointed out that an American presence, including a naval base, would act as a 'buffer' to Japanese aggression, stating: 'Actually the Japanese are in possession, and they do not relish the idea of our giving it away to the Americans'.<sup>120</sup> Hence the statement often made that the Vanderlip concession never became operative because of opposition from the US Government and 'big business' is incorrect.<sup>121</sup> Japan held possession until 1925, the US Government did not feel enabled to officially recognise the USSR until 1933, but American 'big business' initiated commercial relations with the Bolsheviks as early as 1920.<sup>122</sup>

#### **'Poorly Armed and Equipped'**

The reliability of assistance not only for military but also for civil administration relied on recognition of Kolchak's Omsk administration as the *de jure* authority. But neither *de jure* nor *de facto* recognition was ever forthcoming. 'Such assistance could not be relied on without recognition', recalled Kolchak's Foreign Minister, Sukin.<sup>123</sup> Since the 1918 armistice between Soviet Russia and Germany the Allied policy was indefinite and vacillating, writes Smele,<sup>124</sup> who succinctly explains the situation:

By November 1918 there had been Allied troops on Russian territory for the best part of a year. Soviet historians, of course, consistently construed this intervention and the concomitant sponsorship of counter-revolution in Siberia and European Russia as being purely anti-Bolshevik in origin and inspiration.

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<sup>119</sup> Lenin to Vanderlip, March 17, 1921; *Lenin: Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), Vol. 45, p. 98.

<sup>120</sup> Lenin, December 22, 1920; 'Speech To The R.C.P.(B.) Group At The Eighth Congress Of Soviets During The Debate On The Report Of The All-Russia Central Executive Committee And The Council Of People's Commissars Concerning Home And Foreign Policies', Lenin Internet Archive (2003) <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/dec/x01.htm>>

<sup>121</sup> The Vanderlip project was still proceeding in 1922, when Standard Oil purchased one-quarter of the stock and exclusive rights for oil exploration in the area. However the concession could not become operative until diplomatic recognition. 'Standard Oil Joins Vanderlip Project', *New York Times*, January 11, 1922, p. 1.

<sup>122</sup> That year the press reported that on the initiative of American businessmen a 'new international organization had been formed in Denmark to exchange raw materials for manufactured goods after 'lengthy discussions with Maxim Litvinoff', Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 'Americans to Trade with Reds', *New York Times*, February 15, 1920.

<sup>123</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, op.cit., p. 200.

<sup>124</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, ibid., p. 200.

Unfortunately for Kolchak and the Whites, however, this was far from being the whole story.<sup>125</sup>

Wilson at Paris stated that the Allied troops were 'doing no sort of good' in Russia and should be withdrawn. Churchill, one of the few politicians who sought the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, worried that communism would triumph and reduce all of Russia to misery. He urged a detailed study be made to determine what force was needed to defeat Bolshevism. Wilson immediately repudiated Churchill, and without American support there could be no offensive to defeat the Soviets.<sup>126</sup> The attitude of Churchill's Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was in agreement with that of Wilson, and both desired the Allies to meet with Soviet representatives, Lloyd George stating at the Paris conference in 1919 in terms that could only give comfort to the Bolsheviks:

The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason that peasants accepted it in the French Revolution, namely that it gave them land. The Bolsheviks are the *de facto* Government. We formerly recognized the Czar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason was that it was the *de facto* Government... but we refuse to recognise the Bolsheviks! To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people is contrary to every principle for which we have fought.<sup>127</sup>

Lloyd George was wrong on several historical points: the peasants had not accepted Bolshevism. Ironically, the peasants at the time were in revolt against Bolshevism,<sup>128</sup> just as they had been the foundation for a resistance to the proto-'bolshevism' of Revolutionary France, to which George alludes.<sup>129</sup> Describing the Czar's regime as *de facto* and 'rotten' and no more legitimate than the precarious Soviet regime based around Moscow and Petrograd was sending a negative message to many of those resisting the Red Army.

In March 1918, Kolchak was informed of the Bullitt mission to Moscow, which had come back with a favourable view of the Soviet regime.<sup>130</sup>

In April the Allies announced food relief to central Russia, thereby helping to stem popular resentment against the Soviet regime.<sup>131</sup> The aid from the Allies to Kolchak continued, the purpose as explained by Lloyd George in the House of

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<sup>125</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, *ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>126</sup> E M Halliday, 'Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night,' Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>127</sup> Quoted by Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, *op.cit.*, p.p. 76-77.

<sup>128</sup> The 'Green' army for example was a large-scale manifestation of peasant resistance.

<sup>129</sup> The uprising of the Vendee Province in France.

<sup>130</sup> William C Bullitt, an aide with the US State Department, and a member of the American delegation at the 1919 Paris conference, was secretly sent to Russia to make contact with the Bolsheviks, with a brief from Edward House, who told Bullitt that terms could include Allied withdrawal, and the establishment of economic relations. Among Bullitt's choices for his delegation was a journalist, Lincoln Steffens, 'an outspoken admirer of the Soviets...' However, the conservative press was still a major factor in publicising the manoeuvres to recognise the Bolsheviks, and questions were asked in the British Parliament, to Lloyd George's dismay. The Bolsheviks did not help their cause, or that of statesmen such as Wilson and Lloyd George who were trying to sell the idea of accommodating the Bolsheviks to anti-Bolsheviks such as France's Clemenceau, by continuing their revolutionary rhetoric against the West. See: Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, *op. cit.*, Robert S Rifkind, 'The Wasted Mission', pp. 180- 196.

<sup>131</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

Commons being not due to any anti-Bolshevik policy, but because British prestige would suffer if it was seen that the anti-Soviet forces were being abandoned to their fate now that they had served their purposes in regard to the World War. There was also increasingly widespread horror in Britain once the facts in regard to the 'Red Terror' and the bestial nature of Bolshevism became known.<sup>132</sup> It should also be recalled, as previously noted, that Wickham Steed of *The London Times* had conducted a highly effective campaign against recognising the Soviets that, as Lloyd George, complained was preventing him from recognising the Soviets.

In October another blow was struck at Kolchak when Canada, whose troops comprised a major component of the Allied forces, announced it was withdrawing from Siberia.

The prospect of continued Allied aid to Kolchak was pegged to the Admiral's commitment to establishing a liberal order and on pursuing a policy that was in accord with that of the Wilsonian ideals for the post-war world which, as alluded to previously, were analogous to Bolshevism ideology. Hence the US sought commitments from Kolchak that he would not only establish a democratic regime in Russia, but that Russia would join the League of Nations and honour foreign debts.<sup>133</sup> It was made sufficiently clear that if Kolchak was not willing to adopt these post-war aims aid would be curtailed.

Kolchak felt that with military success he would be able to eventually establish his own terms for the governance of Russia. During 1919, despite the demoralising Allied actions of the previous year, it looked possible that the Red Army might be defeated, and it seemed prudent for the USA to maintain its connections with the Omsk regime. There was a danger that the Whites might defeat the Reds with or without Allied aid, and that if without, any subsequent non-Soviet Government would view the Allies with resentment. Another major factor was the possibility that any such Government would turn to Germany, which is what the Soviet regime did with under the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.

Yet, despite the initial successes of Kolchak, in August 1919 *The New York Times* was already reporting that he was in retreat, with 100,000 'poorly armed men' facing a well-equipped Red Army of 500,000. The White Army was 'still fighting bravely, but they are poorly armed and equipped', states a *New York Times* report. The report refers to Kolchak's forces being 'partially armed and equipped':

The defeat of the Omsk Government is authoritatively attributed to the lack of trained soldiers and the lack of military supplies. The setback suffered in the field by the Kolchak army is believed to make more uncertain if not positively unlikely the early recognition of the Omsk Government by the United States and the allied powers'.<sup>134</sup>

Contemporary reports confirm White allegations that Allied support had always been inadequate. Wilson had already determined in early 1919 that American troops would leave Russia. One historian of the period comments of this: 'Having undertaken to lead the White Russians against the Bolsheviks, the Allies were now

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<sup>132</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, *ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>133</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, *ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

<sup>134</sup> 'Kolchak Army in Serious Straits; Disaster Feared. Sadly Lacks Munitions. 100,000 Men Poorly Armed and Equipped Unable to Withstand Red Onrush'; *The New York Times*, August 12, 1919, pp. 1, 5.

about to leave them holding a bag of very dubious tenability'.<sup>135</sup> General Ironsides, the British commander at Archangel, had anticipated such a scuttle and had done what he could to outfit and 'partially train' 15,000 White Russian troops, but rumours of an impending American withdrawal destroyed anti-Bolshevik morale, mutinies spread from April 1919, and hundreds of Whites began deserting to the Red Army after killing their officers.<sup>136</sup> Although the Americans were replaced by 10,000 British troops 'it was soon clear that the intervention was in effect over... The Allies were on their way out'.<sup>137</sup> The British replacements were at Archangel for only three months, before the Whites were left to their own devices, and at first fared quite well against the Reds.

By this time the reputation of the Americans in Siberia was so low that the Kolchak Government requested the American forces *not* to advance into Siberia any further lest the extension of the American presence further aggravated the low opinion the Russians held for the Americans.<sup>138</sup>

In July 1919 General Graves called in the Japanese Chief of Staff and the American commander at Sviagina to condemn the Japanese execution of five suspected Bolsheviks, and reprimanded the American commander for not having forcibly prevented the Japanese from doing so. Graves was to write of this incident:

I felt so strongly about this murder that I brought the commanding officer of Sviagina to American Head-quarters at Vladivostok and, in the presence of the Japanese Chief of Staff, told him he should have used force to prevent it. I also told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if such a thing was ever attempted again in American sectors of the railroad, it would bring on a conflict between Japanese and American troops.<sup>139</sup>

*The New York Times* again reported on the routing of Kolchak by the Red Army and placed the blame on the Allies, and particularly on the US Administration. The Admiral's White Army had been beaten back over 800 miles, 'because he had not sufficient gun power, no airplanes, no tanks, and little food.'

The Allies withheld the necessary supplies, especially the supplies of arms and ammunition from the Omsk Government. ... [T]he Allies have given no officers to Kolchak, not even a non-commissioned officer to train the undisciplined privates he has in some fashion dragged together.

So Kolchak, without ammunition, food or other supplies, and with a patriotic mob he cannot discipline by himself without aid, has done wonders and has finally been routed...<sup>140</sup>

The following day *The New York Times* was reporting that the US Administration had finally agreed to allow the release to Kolchak, in the midst of his

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<sup>135</sup> E M Halliday, 'Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night,' Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>136</sup> E M Halliday, 'Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night,' Oliver Jensen (ed.) *America and Russia*, ibid., p. 178.

<sup>137</sup> E M Halliday, 'Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night, ibid., p. 178.

<sup>138</sup> 'Asks Graves to Stop American Advance. Omsk Government Says Undefined Attitude of United States Causes Trouble in Siberia', *New York Times*, May 19, 1919.

<sup>139</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Japan, The Cossacks and Anti-Americanism'.

<sup>140</sup> 'Kolchak Beaten', *The New York Times*, Editorial, August 13, 1919, p.

retreat, some of the American-made arms and ammunition the US had gone into Russia to guard from German capture in the closing months of World War I, after financial arrangement had been made by White Russian representatives. Diplomatic recognition remained elusive however,<sup>141</sup> despite the urgent plea by Robert S Morris, American Ambassador to Japan, reporting on his mission to Siberia, that US recognition would be vital for the survival of Kolchak's authority, and that had it been given three months previously, the Omsk Government would not have been in its perilous situation.<sup>142</sup> It is notable that even then, and with disquiet from those on the scene regarding the possibility that the White movement might be forced into alliance with Germany and Japan, the arms were only belatedly forthcoming because White Russian agents in the USA had arranged for payment.

After several years, and awaiting arms that had to be paid for by the White movement, Graves still ensured that even now there were delays and ill-will attached to the late delivery, *The New York Times* reporting of the situation that,

Major General Graves recently refused delivery of the arms to the Russian authorities at Vladivostok, his action resulting in criticism of the American command by the Russian authorities in the Far East, as well as by General Knox, chief of the British Military Mission at Omsk, who said that General Graves had held up the delivery of arms which the Russians had bought and paid for.<sup>143</sup>

Graves had been piqued by criticism of American forces in an article in a Vladivostok newspaper and had demanded Kolchak suppress the newspaper. When Kolchak refused, the General decided that withholding 14,000 arms would be apt punishment. The US State Department intervened, *The New York Times* reporting:

In advising General Graves to permit the resumption of arms shipments to the Kolchak forces, state department officials took the position that withholding the rifles now, with a wide offensive against the Bolsheviki starting, might prove fatal to the success of the operation.<sup>144</sup>

That month also (October 1919) when the situation for Kolchak was dire, the Allied authorities demanded that he withdraw from Vladivostok due to the shooting of a drunken American soldier by a Russian officer, who had been struck at by the American after demanding that the soldier desist from anti-Government statements.<sup>145</sup> One might think that in such a situation the Allies would be concerned with the actions of their subordinates, rather than with using the incident as a pretext to yet again try and hamstring Kolchak. The Admiral replied that Vladivostok is a defensive

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<sup>141</sup> 'Arms to Kolchak now being rushed by United States', *New York Times*, August 14, 1919, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>142</sup> 'Envoy Morris Attributes Kolchak's Reverses to Failure to Recognize Him 3 months Ago', *New York Times*, August 28, 1919. p. 1.

<sup>143</sup> 'Semenoff demanded arms of Americans', *New York Times*, November 2, 1919.

<sup>144</sup> 'Released Rifles Held Up by Graves', *New York Times*, October 3, 1919.

<sup>145</sup> The way Graves later explained the incident was that an American soldier was drunk and was called a 'Bolshevik' by a Russian officer, whom he lunged at, the American being shot in response. The Russian turned himself over to a Russian court, which Graves described as 'fake', and was acquitted of wrongdoing. Graves does not mention that the Allies used this as a pretext for demanding Kolchak's withdrawal from Vladivostok. William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Japan, The Cossacks, and Anti-Americanism'.

position and that the Allied demand was an intrusion on Russian sovereignty, and refused to comply.<sup>146</sup>

In November General Semenovff attempted to acquisition for his Cossack forces 15,000 of the 68,000 firearms *en route* to Kolchak under American guard, but the small American contingent was under orders not to provide Semenovff with any arms under any circumstances.<sup>147</sup> Semenovff was again confronted by American troops as he sought to assist Kolchak in his final days.

### **Revolutionists Thankful for American Help**

In December 1919 a revolt by an army regiment against Kolchak in Irkutsk resulted in the proclamation of a revolutionist Government, whose forces proceeded to capture the railway station. Kolchak threatened to bomb the station but was prevented from doing so by the Allies, and the station was declared 'neutral'. Kolchak succeeded in driving the revolutionists across the Irkutsk River. However several days later Kolchak was detained at Nijnie Udinsk after the establishment of a revolutionary authority. Several hundred of Semenovff's soldiers arrived and clashed with the revolutionists.

On January 12, 1920 American troops clashed with Semenovff's troops, which had also fought with the Czechs.<sup>148</sup> Thus, one of the final acts of the American forces had been to clash with the remnants of the White movement under Semenovff, who had been designated by Kolchak as his successor as commander of the White Armies,<sup>149</sup> as he sought to assist Kolchak.

With the end of the Kolchak Government in sight, the US succeeded in persuading Japan to adhere to the US position that the purpose of the Allied presence in Siberia should be to do nothing more than guard the Trans-Siberian railroad.<sup>150</sup> The US had ensured prior to its withdrawal that Kolchak would be left without support.

On entering Vladivostok the revolutionists sought to capture the Russian Governor, General Rozanov, but were prevented from entering his house by Japanese troops. The Americans responded with a Marine detachment whose commanding officer stated to the Japanese that 'interference' would not be tolerated. 'The Japanese then withdrew and all foreign forces observed a neutral attitude'.<sup>151</sup>

The American forces guarding the Trans-Siberian railway left Vladivostok amidst wild acclaim from the revolutionist regime. The *New York Times* reported:

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<sup>146</sup> 'American Soldier Killed by Russian. Shot by Officer he Struck when Ordered to Desist from Agitation. It is Said', *New York Times*, October 11, 1919.

<sup>147</sup> 'Semenovff demanded arms of Americans', *New York Times*, November 2, 1919.

<sup>148</sup> 'Says Kolchak's Staff Joined Revolution. Happenings in Irkutsk Region Before and After Admiral's Overthrow', *New York Times*, January 25, 1920,

<sup>149</sup> 'Revolt in Irkutsk. Admiral Kolchak Resigns Command. Russian Leader said to be Ill, Names Semenovff as Military Successor', *New York Times*, December 28, 1919.

<sup>150</sup> 'America and Japan Agree on Siberia Plan. Tokio Modifies Policy – will now Protect Railways as First Priority, Regardless of Kolchak', *New York Times*, December 27, 1919.

<sup>151</sup> 'Americans Block Japanese Action. Prevent Attempt by Mikado's Troops to Save Gen. Rozanov from Revolutionists', *New York Times*, February 8, 1920. Fortunately, Rozanov escaped and took refuge on a Japanese cruiser; otherwise he would presumably had been dragged from his house and killed within the environs of Allied 'neutrality', although Graves never seemed to have accepted that the revolutionists would be capable of such actions.

Graves was later to recall the Rozanov incident in terms at variance with contemporary press reports, and stated that a single field artillery shot fired at the General's house was sufficient to scare his Japanese guards, who promptly got Rozanov out in disguise. William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Japan, The Cossacks, and Anti-Americanism'. Such jitteriness of the Japanese military seems out of character.

Parades, street meetings and speechmaking marked the second day today of the city's complete liberation from Kolchak authority. Red flags fly on every Government building, many business houses and homes.

There is a pronounced pro-American feeling evident. In front of the American headquarters the revolutionary leaders mounted steps of buildings across the street, making speeches calling the Americans real friends, who at a critical time saved the present movement. The people insist upon an allied policy of no interference internationally in political affairs.

The General Staff of the new Government at Nikolsk has telegraphed to the American commander, Major Gen. Graves, expressing its appreciation for efforts toward guaranteeing an allied policy of non-interference during the occupation of the city, also in aiding in a peaceful settlement of the local situation.<sup>152</sup>

Despite the lengths that Graves went to both during and subsequent to his command in Siberia to repudiate the contention of not only the Whites but also of General Knox that 'by not supporting Kolchak you are encouraging the Bolsheviks to think the United States is supporting them', he conceded that 'There were some truths in this claim'.<sup>153</sup>

In 1920, in the midst of defeat, Kolchak stated that, 'the meaning and essence of this intervention remains quite obscure to me',<sup>154</sup> as his forces were left fleeing for their lives in disarray, abandoned to their fate by the Allies. Kolchak was captured after being betrayed by his Czech guard and was shot by the Revolutionist regime on February 7.<sup>155</sup> Graves, while being appalled at the reports of the punishments allegedly meted out by the White regime, excused the execution of Kolchak as being the result of justified 'resentment by the people', and as having been properly tried and convicted by a 'military court'.<sup>156</sup>

*The New York Times* editorialised with some pertinent analysis of the Allied intervention and the impending collapse of the White remnants, with Denikin's forces in retreat and Semenov only maintained by the Japanese:

There can be no doubt that the allied Governments must bear a large part of the blame for the collapse of this movement. As *The New Europe* recently observed, 'the publicly proclaimed vacillations of our statesmen are worth a whole army corps to the Bolsheviks'.<sup>157</sup>

An inherent weakness in the position of the White movement was also comprehended by the *Times*' editorial as being a lack of unity of ideas, having to 'harmonize political factions running all the way from rather extreme Socialists to supporters of the old autocracy'.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> 'Vladivostok Pro-American. Revolutionist Staff Thanks Graves for Preserving Neutrality', *New York Times*, February 15, 1920.

<sup>153</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'Japan, The Cossacks, and Anti-Americanism'.

<sup>154</sup> Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, op. cit., p. 201

<sup>155</sup> 'Kolchak Sought to Save Companions. 48 Officers and Civilians Refused to Leave Him when Miners Halted Train. Czech Guard Gave Him Up', *New York Times*, February 22, 1920.

<sup>156</sup> William S Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, op. cit., 'The Gaidar Revolution'.

<sup>157</sup> 'Kolchak's Fall', *New York Times*, December 30, 1919.

<sup>158</sup> 'Kolchak's Fall', *New York Times*, *ibid.*

Sayers and Kahn remarking on the Civil War stated that the aims of the White movement were to restore the old order— but that ‘the war aims of the Allies in Russia were less clear... The intervention was finally presented to the world by allied spokesmen, in so far as its motives were publicized at all, as a political crusade against Bolshevism. Actually, “anti-Bolshevism” played a secondary role’.<sup>159</sup> But what Sayers and Kahn could not say was that business interests in the West were as willing to reach accord with the Soviets as with anyone else; hence the lack of any mention by the pro-Soviet American authors of the Vanderlip concession or of the unnamed Americans reported by *The New York Times* as having formed a consortium for Soviet trade as early as 1920, or of the extensive commercial and financial relations Britain, the USA and Germany soon established with the Soviets.

## Conclusion

The Allied intervention served Soviet purposes. Such a crisis was required in order to consolidate the Bolshevik position. Luckett in his history of the Civil War states that the Allied intervention had ‘helped the Soviets’ by making the Soviet cause appear to be ‘patriotic rather than factional’.<sup>160</sup> Of the Great Powers, only Japan and France had the aim of eliminating Bolshevism, while Britain sought to get out without being seen as dishonourable, and America’s presence served as nothing other than a menace to the White movement.

Robert Service writes that,

Lenin and Trotsky had wanted a civil war in order to have the chance to carry out their irreversible suppression of the enemies of the October Revolution. Neither of them said this directly in public. A secret telegram that Trotsky had sent to Lenin on 17 August 1918 summed up their attitude:

I consider it unacceptable to let steamers sail [the Volga] under a Red Cross flag. The receipt of grain will be interpreted by charlatans and fools as showing the possibility that agreement can be made and that civil war is unnecessary. The military motives are unknown to me. Air pilots and artillerymen have been ordered to bomb and set fire to the bourgeois district of Kazan and then to Simbirsk and Samara. In these conditions a Red Cross caravan is inappropriate.<sup>161</sup>

Luckett states that, ‘The Civil War removed from Russia, through death or exile, the greater part of the upper and middle classes. It polarised the political conflict and reinforced the monolithic structure of the emergent state’.<sup>162</sup>

Of particular interest is that Luckett contends that rather than a commitment to the restoration of monarchy being a weakness or a cause of divisiveness, had the White movement from the start declared its commitment to Czarism it would have initially lost ‘some of their adherents’ but that in the long run the gains ‘could have been very considerable’.<sup>163</sup> Not surprisingly, the ‘White movement’ having embraced sundry elements from Socialist Revolutionaries to Czarists, with the bizarre situation

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<sup>159</sup> Michael Sayers and Albert E Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>160</sup> Richard Luckett, *The White Generals: The White Movement and the Russian Civil War* (London: Longman, 1971), p. 386.

<sup>161</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, op. cit., p. 223.

<sup>162</sup> Richard Luckett, *The White Generals*, op. cit., p. 387.

<sup>163</sup> Richard Luckett, *The White Generals*, *ibid.*, p. 388.

of great Czarist military leaders such as Kolchak having to offer their services to Socialist Revolutionaries, had no positive unifying factor. Of course, the Allies, led by Wilson and Lloyd George, were unrestrained in their contempt for Czarism.

The elimination of the Bolshevik regime was not a doomed cause, despite the wishful thinking of many Allied representatives and businessmen. Far from it. The Bolsheviks started with a precarious hold that did not extend far beyond Moscow and Petrograd. Lockett concludes in his study that although the White army made many strategic blunders, '...the Reds made mistakes also: in exclusively military matters they made far more than the Whites... Given the White failure to organise politically, their achievements are all the more remarkable.'<sup>164</sup>

In October 1919, although Kolchak was being pushed back in Siberia, Yudenich's forces came within eight miles of Petrograd and the Soviet regime had moved its seat of power to Moscow.<sup>165</sup> Although the Red Army pushed Yudenich back from the verge of triumph, Robert Service writes:

Armed conflicts continued to cover Russian and Ukrainian territory as peasants rose in revolt against the Soviet order with its expropriations and conscriptions. Scarcely had the Red Army defeated Yudenich than it was being sent out to crush the rebellions. The Greens<sup>166</sup> roamed across province after province. Mutinies broke out in Red Army garrisons. Industrial strikes broke out in an increasing number of factories and mines. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes also continued to occur in outlying regions. The Bashkirs and Tatars were fighting each other in the southern Urals. Muslim communities fought with Russians in the province by the River Volga.<sup>167</sup>

Yet according to Graves' reminiscences, written over a decade later and with the advantage of hindsight, the Russian peasants and workers were entirely in support of the Bolsheviks, and the White movement comprised a 'crowd' of sadistic reactionaries and autocrats.

Service comments of this situation that while the White forces sought to regroup and challenge the Red Army,

Their hopes were undermined by the decision of the United Kingdom and France to halt their intervention in the Civil War. In December 1919 the British withdrew from Archangel, the French from Odessa. Neither Trotsky nor his leading comrades made much comment because they were wary of concluding that the threat of an anti-Bolshevik crusade was over... The Reds had come close to defeat several times since the Civil War.

... The Civil War was a close run conflict between the Reds and the Whites.<sup>168</sup>

The White forces were literally stabbed in the back by the machinations of the Allied politicians, and the 'vested interests', to use Wilson's term, that saw bright prospects for business dealings with their supposed arch-enemies.

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<sup>164</sup> Richard Lockett, *The White Generals*, *ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>165</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>166</sup> Peasant partisans often led by anarchists.

<sup>167</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *ibid.*, p. 244.

<sup>168</sup> Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography*, *ibid.*, p. 244-245.

The lessons of US duplicity in regard to aiding supposed friends, and particularly those in conflict were communism, could have been a warning to those finding themselves in similar circumstances and who succumbed because of American betrayal, from China<sup>169</sup> to Cuba<sup>170</sup> to Nicaragua<sup>171</sup> to Tibet,<sup>172</sup> where on each occasion the USA scuttled at the crucial juncture. The tendency towards treachery that remains a factor of American foreign relations, which continues the Wilsonian doctrine for ‘world order’, is something that still needs learning by those who would ‘sup with the devil’.

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<sup>169</sup> Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: the Unknown Story* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), Chapter 28, ‘Saved By Washington’, pp. 292-303.

<sup>170</sup> Mario Lazo, *Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba* (New York: Twin Circle Publishing co., 1968).

<sup>171</sup> Anastasio Somoza and Jack Cox, *Nicaragua Betrayed* (Boston: Western Islands, 1980).

<sup>172</sup> R Sengupta, ‘The CIA Circus: Tibet’s Forgotten Army’, Friends of Tibet (India), February 15, 1999, <http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/usdefence/usd7.html>

See also: K R Bolton, ‘The Tragedy of Tibet: A Saga of Betrayal, Colonization and Exploitation’, *Foreign Policy Journal*, June 25, 2010, <<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/06/25/the-tragedy-of-tibet-a-saga-of-betrayal-colonization-and-exploitation/>>